Nevertheless, some aspects of China under Xi’s autocracy, both internally and in its foreign relations, are well-established and likely to persist. For one, China would likely see victory for Putin as a major leap towards its desired revision of the world order. But not necessarily in the way one might think.
Hitherto, many Western commentators have clung to the notion that China seeks to reform rather than overthrow the international rules-based order established post-1945 represented by institutions like the UN. They are wrong: The revisionist nature of Xi’s vision of a China-led “new era” would move to the fore if Ukraine fell, and profoundly.
This was the clear message of Xi’s farewell words to Putin in Moscow in March 2023: “changes are happening that have not been seen for 100 years; we are driving these together”. Putin agreed. Xi was signalling a joint assault on liberal norms; indeed, one of the most obvious impacts of the war has been to show the fragility of bodies like the UN, with Russia and China’s veto effectively giving Moscow a blank cheque to get away, quite literally, with murder.
This said, the background to their expedient sharing of revisionist goals is not straightforward. The CCP are neuralgic about losing autonomy through association with any external forces. Forced by realpolitik necessity to align with Putin just before the invasion, CCP pragmatism has turned his error to China’s advantage, driving hard bargains for importing game-changing amounts of Russian energy while watching the West and Russia exhaust each other. Prolonged frozen conflict remains Beijing’s favoured outcome.
But even if Putin wins outright, crucially Xi’s plans for China as leader of a new world order include no place at the high table for Putin emboldened by victory in Ukraine, let alone turning belligerent eyes on the Baltics, Poland and Central Europe. The CCP hopes for revived growth as Russia’s main energy market, but is committed to remaining clear of reciprocal dependency.
Putin, for his part, is already visibly needy for Xi’s long-delayed agreement on “Power of Siberia 2”, a gas pipeline to China via Mongolia. He reportedly intends to pitch Beijing shortly for another via Kazakhstan.