For Russia’s conventional and hybrid threats to US allies in Europe are intensifying by the day. Hours before the Alaska stand-off, the Romanian Defence Ministry announced the discovery of Russian kamikaze drone fragments near the town of Plauru. This drone attack was a spill-over from Russia’s assault on Ukraine’s Izmail port on Odesa’s Danube coast. In tandem with that announcement, French police arrested a 40-year-old Russian chef for conspiring with the FSB to destabilise the Paris Olympics.
Elsewhere, despite a shaky truce between China and the Philippines, Beijing’s maritime boundary revisionism in the South China Sea remains a potent threat. China recently suspended arms control talks with the US over Washington’s military support for Taiwan and continues to rapidly modernise its nuclear arsenal. Taiwan’s record-setting Han Kuang war games this year, which test its preparations for a Chinese invasion, could reignite cross-strait brinkmanship.
All this shows the US has fundamentally failed to deter these parallel track forms of aggression and been equally ineffective in restricting Sino-Russian cooperation. During his April 2024 trip to Beijing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned of US punishments for China’s continued support for Russian aggression in Ukraine. He highlighted China’s supply of micro-electronics and machine tools that strengthen Russia’s defence-industrial base and warned that sanctions on over 100 Chinese entities were just the tip of the iceberg.
But the US threats produced only superficial successes. While from January to June 2024, Russia-China bilateral trade increased by 1.8 per cent instead of the 26.3 per cent growth that occurred during the first half of 2023, and China’s selective stalling of Russian transactions led to a reduction in Chinese exports to Russia, since then, Xi Jinping’s economic advisor’s trip to Moscow underlined that Russia-China economic cooperation has not been contained, with their strategic cooperation and manufacturing collaboration plans continuing at pace.
More worryingly, the Bering Sea drills, which forced this Alaska interception, are just the latest in a long string of provocative military exercises involving Russia and China. In mid-March, Russia, China, and Iran conducted maritime drills in the Gulf of Oman. During these exercises, Iran’s Shahid Soleimani corvette brandished anti-ship cruise missiles that the US has historically found hard to intercept. China’s recent Eagle Assault “anti-terrorism” training exercise, which was conducted with Russia’s closest ally Belarus, simulated the capture of a Polish airport. A new military axis is coming together before our eyes and the US looks like a helpless bystander.
This passivity is more dangerous as Russia and China are on a war footing. Moscow’s victory in the Donetsk battleground of Urozhaine and near-triumph in the Chasiv Yar logistical hub reveal that its offensive plans in Ukraine are not slowing down. Britain’s new Chief of the General Staff Sir Roly Walker warned that, even if it loses in Ukraine, Russia “will come back to get their revenge”. Meanwhile, China is stockpiling vast quantities of agricultural resources, such as corn, wheat, and soy, as well as oil, copper, and steel. This points to preparations for a trade war with the US or, perhaps, a hot war in the Pacific.
History provides clues as to where Russian and Chinese disrespect for US redlines might lead us. Germany’s 1914 invasion of Belgium stemmed from its false confidence that Britain would not risk a world war over Belgian neutrality. Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour was premised on the assumption that the US would not commit its forces to a multi-year war in the Pacific theatre.
Biden’s perceived weakness and Trump’s unpredictability, if he wins, could encourage America’s adversaries to make similarly grave miscalculations. The risk of an accidental conflict in the lead-up to November’s elections or in their aftermath requires careful mitigation. For otherwise the world could spiral into far more desperate scenarios, including the very worst imaginable: a new world war.
Dr Samuel Ramani is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)